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ABSTRACT 
Various education finance and taxation reforms in the past several decades have substan-
tially changed China’s system for funding basic education, but the present system is still 
characterized by insufficient funding and large inequalities across localities. Using data of 
more than 2000 county-level units all over the country during 1998-2005, this study uses Theil 
index to spatially decompose the pattern of funding inequality in China’s basic education 
across four geographic and administrative levels. The analysis shows that the level of ine-
quality remained high after the rural taxation and education finance reforms since 2000, de-
spite the efforts to increase education-purpose fiscal transfers to local governments, and that 
the gaps are especially severe across provinces in the same region and across prefectures in 
the same province.  
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the development of the funding system for China’s basic 
education program has attracted a lot of public and scholarly attention.1 Vari-
ous reforms in the past several decades have substantially changed this system, 
but the present system is still characterized by insufficient funding and large 
inequalities across regions and localities. Existing studies on inequalities in 
1. Basic education in China refers to pre-school, nine-year compulsory education from ele-
mentary to junior high school, standard senior high school education, special education for 
disabled children, and education for illiterate people. For more details, see 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/Brief/192134.htm.  
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basic education have mostly employed data at the national or provincial level 
(Tsang, 1994; Xue and Shi, 2001; Li, 2008). Only a few examined funding 
inequality of China’s basic education using county-level data (Pan, 2000; 
Tsang and Ding, 2005; Wang, 2001). Analyses based on provincial-level data 
cannot fully reveal the real pattern of inequalities across local jurisdictions, 
because major responsibilities for funding basic education rest with cities and 
urban districts in urban areas, and with counties in rural areas (Wang and Zhao, 
2012). Therefore, policy decisions based on such analyses without careful 
evaluation would not be effective in mitigating educational inequalities and 
improving educational performance. Taking advantage of a database on more 
than 2000 counties/districts in the country covering 1998-2005, this study as-
sesses changes in the pattern of inequalities in funding for basic education, 
and spatially decomposes the inequalities at four levels, including counties, 
cities or prefectures, provinces, and the eastern, central and western regions in 
China.2  
This study mainly addresses the following three research questions: (a) 
What was the state of inequality in funding for basic education at the four lev-
els in China in recent years? (b) Was there a change in inequality after educa-
tion finance and taxation reforms in recent years? (c) At what geographic or 
administrative level is the fiscal inequality of China’s basic education espe-
cially severe? The last question is especially important for the Chinese gov-
ernment to design proper intergovernmental grants to mitigate the funding in-
equalities for China’s basic education. This study has two major contributions. 
First, we did not find any empirical analysis on the funding inequality of Chi-
na’s basic education based on a national county-level dataset after 2000, a pe-
riod in which the education finance and rural taxation systems went through 
substantial changes. Since 2001, the central government shifted the adminis-
trative responsibilities of rural basic education to the county level, and imple-
mented a series of policies to make up for the loss of revenues to education 
(Wang and Zhao, 2012). Second, this study is the only and very first effort to 
spatially decompose China’s education fiscal inequalities at four levels. Not 
only does the study provide a more accurate depiction of the real pattern of the 
inequalities than previous provincial-level studies, but also it has direct policy 
implications in particular to the design and implementation of intergovern-
mental grants to mitigate China’s educational inequalities and improve educa-
2. The government system in China is divided into five levels: the central, provincial, prefec-
tural, county and township level (Wong, 1997).  There is a strict vertical hierarchical relation-
ship among these levels of government (Shah and Shen, 2008). Governments at the lower 
levels are wholly subordinate to those of higher levels (Wong, 1997). The eastern, central and 
western regions in China were first determined in 1986 by China’s “Seventh Five-Year Na-
tional Socio-Economic Development Plan”. The eastern region include Beijing, Tianjin, He-
bei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan; the central 
region includes Shanxi, Neimenggu, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, and 
Guagnxi; the western region includes Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shannxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang.   
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tional performance. During 1994-2000, the Chinese central government main-
ly allocated its grants for basic education to provincial-level governments, 
which were categorized as three “Pians” (groups) according to their progress 
and capacity in achieving the universalization of nine-year compulsory educa-
tion by 2000 (Tsang and Ding, 2005). The distribution of funding within prov-
inces was then left to the provincial governments, which did not necessarily 
take fully into consideration the actual funding needs of various local govern-
ments within their jurisdiction. Without knowing at which level the fiscal ine-
quality is especially severe, it would be difficult to target intergovernmental 
grants for effective equalization. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section in-
troduces China’s education finance system and some recent reforms since 
1985. The third section reviews previous literature on funding inequality in 
China’s basic education, and the fourth section discusses data and methodolo-
gy of our empirical analysis. The fifth section presents our empirical results. 
The final section concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of our 
study. 
 
2. CHINA’S RECENT EDUCATION FINANCE REFORMS 
 
The education finance reform in 1985 set up an overly decentralized fund-
ing system for China’s basic education (Tsang, 2000). Under this system, local 
governments below the provincial level were charged with the responsibility 
for the financing of primary and secondary education, and different levels of 
education were administered by different levels of government. In urban areas, 
cities and urban districts were responsible for financing secondary and prima-
ry education, respectively. In rural areas, higher-secondary education was fi-
nanced by county governments, whereas lower-secondary education and pri-
mary education were respectively financed by township and village govern-
ments (Tsang, 2002). Because of the over-decentralization of education fi-
nancing and absence of effective fiscal transfers from higher levels of the gov-
ernment, regional economic inequalities led to inequalities in resources for 
basic education directly (Lin, 2009; Tsang, 2000).  
 
The “Tax-For-Fee” reform implemented since 2000 created some substan-
tial impact on the financing of basic education in China. The reform was first 
introduced in Anhui in 2000, and then introduced to 20 other provinces in 
2002 (Kennedy, 2007). Later, it was implemented all over the country. The 
reform replaced all fees collected previously by townships and villages with 
agriculture taxes and related surcharges (Lu et al., 2004). It helped to lower 
farmers’ burden and reduce rural tension in China (Yep, 2004), but it might 
also have created some undue effects on the fiscal capacity of local govern-
ments to provide public services such as basic education (Wong and Bird, 
2005). The reform abolished fees and extra-budgetary fundraising for educa-
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tion (Kennedy, 2007), but the fiscal transfers from above did not fully com-
pensate for the loss of funding for village and township governments (Yep, 
2004). Thus, with the implementation of the reform, the inadequacy in funding 
for education, especially in rural areas, has become a more significant problem 
(Kennedy, 2007). 
 
In the wake of the rural taxation reform, the Chinese central government 
has begun to take on more responsibility for financing basic education since 
2001 (Brock et al., 2008). The State Council (2001) issued The Decision on 
the Reform and Development of Basic Education, committing to work with 
provincial governments to increase investment for basic education in poorer 
areas and ethnic minority areas through fiscal transfers to lower levels of gov-
ernment. The Chinese central government shifted the administrative responsi-
bilities of compulsory education from the village and township level to the 
county level (Lu et al., 2004). In 2002, The General Office of the State Coun-
cil (2002) issued The Notice of Completing the Management System of Com-
pulsory Education in Rural Areas, which again stressed the importance for 
provincial governments to provide financial help to local governments, partic-
ularly county-level governments (Lin, 2009). After 2001, the Chinese central 
government introduced the so-called “two exemptions and one subsidy” poli-
cy (TEOS) for the purpose of easing local governments’ financial difficulties 
and reducing the financial burdens of rural families for paying for their chil-
dren’s education. Under this system, major efforts have been made by the cen-
tral and provincial governments to provide free textbooks to poor rural stu-
dents (the first exemption), to provide exemption from “miscellaneous fees” 
(zafei) to the same students (the second exemption), along with a subsidy to 
cover living costs for boarding students with financial difficulties (the one 
subsidy). Since 2006, the central government has significantly increased its 
own share of funding to the TEOS program, reducing the burden on provincial 
and local governments. The expansion of the program later on has led to the 
formulation of a new finance mechanism for basic education in rural areas 
(Brock et al., 2008), which is beyond the scope of this study. In general, the 
shift of administrative responsibilities for education upward to a higher level 
of government and the increase of fiscal transfers for education from the cen-
tral and provincial governments have to a certain extent made the education 
finance system more centralized than before, though inadequacy in funding 
for education still remain a concern.  
 
3. PREVIOUS LITERTURE ON CHINA’S EDUCAITON FINANCE    
    INEQUALITIES 
 
With national data from 1997 and 1999, several county-level studies used 
the Theil index to measure and compare funding inequality of China’s basic 
education within or across provinces (Pan, 2000; Tsang and Ding, 2005; 
Wang, 2001). Using either per-capita or per-pupil basic education expendi-
	  5	  
	  
tures, the results in general showed that intra-provincial inequality was more 
pronounced than the inter-provincial one, though the relative shares of the two 
inequalities varied in different studies.  
 
With incomplete county-level data from 19 provinces, 3 Pan (2000) used 
multiple inequality indices, including the Theil index, Gini coefficient, and 
coefficient of variation, to study the inequality of basic education expenditure 
in 1997, and explored factors that may explain regional differences. He found 
that the inequality of per-pupil basic education expenditure was far more pro-
nounced than that of per-capita basic education expenditure, especially when 
the indices were measured across counties in the same province. For per-
capita basic education expenditure, intra-provincial inequality accounted for 
about 55% of the total inequality, only slightly higher than the inter-provincial 
one. For per-pupil expenditure, however, the intra-provincial inequality played 
a more predominant role, about 2 to 3 times higher than the inter-provincial 
one.  With a regression analysis, Pan showed that the county-level fiscal ca-
pacity was the most influential factor for the education finance disparity.   
 
With data in 2,178 counties, cities and districts all over the country in 
1999, Wang (2001) used three generalized entropy indices, including the Theil 
index, to examine the inequality of per-pupil basic education expenditures that 
were either budgetary or extra-budgetary. She found much higher levels of 
inequality in the extra-budgetary spending than in the budgetary one, likely 
because counties in more affluent areas were in a better position to generate 
extra-budgetary resources than other counties.  Looking at all students from 
both urban and rural areas, the share of intra-provincial inequality accounted 
for 65% to 70% of total inequality based on various categories of per-pupil 
budgetary and extra-budgetary education spending4 for primary and lower-
secondary schools. Looking separately at spending for rural schools in the 
1,773 ordinary counties and counties under Municipalities directly affiliated to 
the central government, the intra-provincial inequality accounted for an even 
higher share, ranging from 67% to 74%.  Accordingly, Wang (2001) argued 
that intergovernmental grants within provinces should play a more active role 
in equalizing per-pupil basic education spending between urban and rural are-
as and across different counties.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3. Pan (2000)’s analysis excludes those districts under prefectural-level cities and Municipali-
ties directly affiliated to the central government from the analysis. 
4. Extra-budgetary spending was funded by education revenue outside of government’s budg-
et, which included education surcharges and levies, education fees (tuition and miscellaneous 
school fees), income from school-owned enterprises, work-study and service, and social con-
tributions and donations (Tsang and Ding, 2005). 
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Based on a dataset of 2,950 county-level units in 1997 and 1999,5 Tsang 
and Ding (2005) examined recourse utilization and inequalities in basic educa-
tion in China. They found that while the pattern of resource utilization was 
similar across different areas in the country, there were substantial inequalities 
in the level of per-pupil spending across these areas. The spending gap was 
particularly substantial between urban and rural areas, and between coastal 
region and other regions. Although non-minority areas spent more than minor-
ity areas, the gap was relatively modest. Decomposition of the Theil indexes 
indicated that between two-thirds and three-quarters of financial inequality 
resided within provinces, and between one-quarter to one-third of the financial 
inequality existed between provinces. Comparison of 1997 and 1999 results 
showed that nationwide, there was no significant change in the overall level of 
inequality in per-pupil total spending. In fact, in the same period, the spending 
gap increased between counties at the top-end and bottom-end of the spending 
distribution, as per-pupil total spending increased much faster at the top end 
than at the bottom end.  
 
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, previous studies 
typically used some single year data of selected counties due to data availabil-
ity, and thus failed to show how the trends of education inequality evolved 
over time. Second, no studies have been done with data after 2000 when Chi-
na launched a series of recent education finance reforms. We do not know 
whether the education inequality has been substantially changed since the 
Chinese government raised the provision of rural education from towns or vil-
lages to the county level along with the allocation of additional education 
grants. Third, and most importantly, previous studies that decomposed ine-
quality into inter- and intra-provincial components provided insufficient in-
formation to guide equalization efforts. As Tsang and Ding (2005) alluded, the 
inter-provincial inequality may exist in part across different regions, as the 
Municipalities and coastal provinces are more developed socioeconomically 
and more resourceful fiscally than other provinces, while western provinces, 
on the other hand, may receive more central government support due to recent 
western-development central policy or national-unity considerations (Zhao, 
2009). Moreover, the intra-provincial inequality could be further divided as 
the inequality across prefectures as well as between counties in the same pre-
fecture. This demarcation is important because the prefecture level sits be-
tween the provincial level and the county one, and provinces rarely allocate 
their grants directly to counties bypassing the prefecture level. In this study, 
we aim to bridge these gaps by conducting a four-level Theil index analysis – 
including the region level, provincial level, prefectural level, and the county 
level – with the most comprehensive database currently available during the 
period of 1998-2005.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5. All mainland provincial-level regions except for Tibet are included in the dataset (Tsang 
and Ding, 2005).  
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Thanks to the Barometer on China’s Development (BOCD) project, the 
Universities Service Center (USC) at the Chinese University of Hong Kong 
built a database with various fiscal and socio-economic variables for all of the 
prefectures and county-level governments in China for recent years.6 The 
sources of the database are from official annual series of statistics yearbooks. 
The education spending data used for this analysis are from the Countrywide 
Prefecture, City and County Financial Statistics published by the Ministry of 
Finance. The data for population are from the Countrywide County/City Popu-
lation Statistics published by the Ministry of Public Security. The data for stu-
dent numbers are from China County (City) Socio-economic Statistical Year-
book published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. We use the data 
covering the period of 1998-2005, the most recent years’ data available, for 
this analysis.  
 
Berne and Stiefel (1984) discussed various concepts of inequality in the 
financing of public education and alternative ways to measure them quantita-
tively. Many subsequent studies used their framework to analyze educational 
equality. Some variation of a per-pupil expenditure measure is mostly adopted 
as a means to gauge the distribution of educational resources. Alternative 
measures of education input include per-capita education expenditure or edu-
cation expenditure as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Wang and 
Zhao, 2012; Wang, Zheng and Zhao, 2012). In this study we use both per-
capita education expenditure and per-pupil education expenditure to control 
for the differences in the size across jurisdictions. Each measure has its 
strength and weakness. The per-pupil measure more accurately reflects the 
level of education investment on its target group than the per-capita measure. 
However, the latter is more convenient for policy comparison than the former 
because data on population is more widely available than data on student 
numbers. Using both measures in one study, we also intend to compare the 
results and assess the comparability between the per-capita measure and per-
pupil measure.  Expenditure measures should ideally be adjusted for the costs 
in providing a unit of education in different regions. However, due to the limi-
tation of data availability, we do not have the data to adjust for regional cost 
differences in the country. None of the previous studies using national data 
have attempted to do so (Pan, 2000; Tsang and Ding, 2005; Wang, 2001); this 
may be a fruitful area for future research. 
 
There are many potential measures of inequality, such as restricted range, 
coefficient of variation, and Gini index etc., that can be used, all with distinct 
advantages and shortcomings (Berne and Stiefel, 1984). For this analysis, we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6. It is the most comprehensive database we are aware of for local governments in China that 
has recently become accessible to researchers. 
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choose the Theil index, which can be conveniently decomposed by different 
levels of geographical aggregation. The use of the Theil index for our analysis 
also enables us to make comparisons with the results of previous studies con-
cerning the distribution of inter- and intra-provincial inequalities of education 
spending in China. Following Murray et al. (1998), the Theil index for prov-
ince k equals 
                                                                                       (1)
 
where  is per-capita expenditure in county j,  is the number of counties 
in province k,  is the population in county j in province k, and  is the 
population-weighted mean expenditure per capita for the province. A value of 
zero on the Theil index indicates equality in per-capita spending among coun-
ties. The index reaches the natural log of the county population when one 
county has all expenditures in the province and the rest have nothing.  
 Theil index can be decomposed to show the inequality in per-capita 
spending between and within provinces. Across all provinces and counties in 
our sample, the decomposition can be written as  
 
                                     (2) 
 
where  is a population-weighted mean expenditure per capita for the coun-
try. The first term on the right-hand side of the equation measures between-
province inequality. The second term measures the degree of within-province 
inequality and can be interpreted as a weighted average of the within-province 
Theil index values. Such an approach of two-level decomposition has been 
adopted by previous research on China’s education inequality (Pan, 2000; 
Tsang and Ding, 2005; Wang, 2001) to determine the extent to which the ine-
quality occurred due to variations across different provinces or within each 
province.  In this article, we will further extend this method to conduct a four-
level Theil decomposition. For the first time, the BOCD project enables Chi-
na’s education expenditure data to be aggregated at four different aggregate 
levels: county, prefecture, provincial, and regional level. The overall Theil in-
dex of education expenditure is measured at the county level. Then we will 
decompose the index into four components: (a) between different geographic 
regions, (b) between provinces in each region, (c) between prefectures in each 
province, and (d) between counties in each prefecture.  
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            Tcounty-in-prefecture  = Tbetween-county - Tbetween-prefecture                                             (3) 
 
            Tprefecture-in-province  = Tbetween-prefecture - Tbetween-province                                      (4) 
    
            Tprovince-in-region  = Tbetween-province - Tbetween-region                                                  (5) 
  
Results of the four-level decomposition will have significant policy impli-
cations. If intergovernmental grants are used to enhance equalization of basic 
education provision, the equalization effect may be most efficiently achieved 
if the grants are allocated at the level that has the highest between-units ine-
quality.  
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
We conducted Theil index analyses to assess China’s basic education ine-
quality in three ways: (a) with per-capita education expenditure, (b) with per-
pupil education expenditure, and (c) with per-pupil education expenditure on 
27 regular provinces after excluding the four Municipalities (special cities 
with provincial status).7 As it turns out, the three analyses provided very dif-
ferent results regarding the pattern of inequality and its changes, suggesting 
that caution should be exercised in selecting measures to assess China’s edu-
cation inequality.  
 
Table 1 shows the first set of Theil indices, which were calculated based 
on per-capita education expenditures of more than 2000 county-level jurisdic-
tions during 1998-2005.8 In the eight-year period, the average per-capita edu-
cation expenditure has increased from about 80 Yuan to about 200 Yuan (in 
real 2000 Yuan), indicating a rapid increase of public education investment. 
However, the average level remains very low compared with international 
standards (Li, 2008). As late as in 2008, China’s public expenditure on educa-
tion represented only 3.3% of the country’s GDP, compared with 5.9% of that, 
on average, across OECD countries, and 7.2% in the United States (OECD, 
2011).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7. These Municipalities are Beijing, Shanghai, Tijian, and Chongqing, four megacities in Chi-
na that are given provincial status.  
8. The sample size is 2075 in year 1999, 2009 in 2000, 1878 in 2002, 1898 in 2002, 1876 in 
2003, 1862 in 2004, and 1865 in 2005. The decrease of sample size is mainly due to admin-
istration changes such as consolidating counties or converting counties into city-level districts. 
While they are still considered county-level jurisdictions, several hundred city-level districts 
are not included in our sample as we were not able to match their student enrollment data 
(provided at the city level only) with education expenditure data (provided at the district-level 
of these cities). In assessing per-capita inequality and per-pupil inequality, we used the same 
set of samples to enable a direct comparison of the results.  
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Table 1. Theil Index of Per-capita Education Expenditure 
 
 
 
The overall Theil index is measured at the county-level, and thus it is a 
lower-bound estimation of the true level of inequity should it be measured at 
the school or student level. The Theil index slightly decreased from about 
0.168 in 1998 to about 0.141 in 2002, and then rose again and fluctuated 
around 0.157 during 2003-2005. The results suggest that the inequality was 
reduced in the beginning years of “Tax-For-Fee” reform, probably due to a 
higher level of central government grants that may have had partial equaliza-
tion effects. After 2002, however, the level of inequality increased again in 
accompany with a significant growth of education expenditure in several Mu-
nicipalities and some coastal provinces.9 Overall, it may be safe to say that, 
after the Tax-For-Fee reform, the level of education finance inequality has not 
been substantively reduced despite the fact that education administration has 
been more centralized than before. Decomposing the Theil index sheds addi-
tional light on the spatial distribution of inequality. In 1998, the between-
region Theil index is 0.037, equal to about 22.2% of the overall Theil index 
with a value of 0.168. This means the variations among the three regions 
(Eastern, Central, and Western) account for about 22.2% of the overall ine-
quality, while the within-region variations account for the remaining 77.8%. 
The within-region variations occur among governments at the lower levels, 
which can be further decomposed to the contribution of province, prefecture, 
and county levels. Thus we can distinguish and separate the extent to which 
each level of government contributes to the overall inequality.  Table 1 shows 
how the indices (or its percentage contributions) are decomposed either by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9. We observed a similar pattern with the coefficients of variation (CV) measured either at 
province or at county level: the CV decreased annually during 1999-2002 but then increased 
again after 2003. The federal ratio, however, shows a more complicated picture: at the prov-
ince level, the ratio follows the similar pattern with the Theil index and CV; at the county lev-
el, the ratio increased during 1999-2000 and fluctuated after 2002.  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Per Capita Education Expenditure* 83.0 90.2 92.1 113.3 132.7 143.8 168.9 193.3
Between-county Theil Index 0.168 0.166 0.160 0.150 0.141 0.157 0.157 0.158
Two-level decomposition: 
County-in-province 0.047 0.054 0.058 0.060 0.056 0.064 0.062 0.065
  % contribution 28.3% 32.6% 35.9% 40.0% 39.6% 40.6% 39.8% 41.5%
Between-province 0.120 0.112 0.103 0.090 0.085 0.094 0.094 0.092
  % contribution 71.7% 67.4% 64.1% 60.0% 60.4% 59.4% 60.2% 58.5%
Total % contribution 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Four-level decomposition:
County-in-prefecture 0.020 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.027 0.026 0.025
  % contribution 11.8% 14.7% 15.9% 17.6% 17.1% 16.9% 16.3% 16.2%
Prefecture-in-province 0.028 0.030 0.032 0.034 0.032 0.037 0.037 0.040
 % contribution 16.5% 17.9% 20.1% 22.3% 22.5% 23.8% 23.5% 25.3%
Province-in-region 0.083 0.075 0.078 0.063 0.059 0.064 0.064 0.063
  % contribution 49.5% 45.4% 48.7% 42.0% 42.2% 40.6% 40.8% 39.9%
Beteween-region 0.037 0.036 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.030 0.030 0.029
 % contribution 22.2% 22.0% 15.4% 18.0% 18.2% 18.8% 19.4% 18.6%
Total % contribution 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Observations 2501 2778 2814 2839 2830 2829 2838 2841
*: In 2000 real RMB. 
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two levels (above or below province), or by four levels (region, province, pre-
fecture, and county) during 1998-2005. For two-level decomposition, varia-
tions at or above the provincial level in general account for a higher percent-
age of inequality than variations within provinces, especially in late 1990s. 
This result runs against the previous finding by Pan (2000) with 1997 data, 
suggesting a possible change of pattern in more recent years.10 More details 
can be seen at the four-level decomposition. Above the provincial level, the 
between-region variations are smaller than between-province-in-region varia-
tions; below the provincial level, the between-prefecture variations are larger 
than between-county-in-prefecture variations. In 2005, for example, the be-
tween-region contribution of inequality is 18.6%, the between-province-in-
region contribution is 39.9%, the between-prefecture-in-province contribution 
is 25.3%, and the between-county-in-prefecture contribution is 16.2 %.  
 
Table 2 presents the second set of Theil indices, which were calculated 
based on per-pupil education expenditure of all available jurisdiction units 
during 1999-2005.11 Our results in 1999 show that the intra-provincial ine-
quality accounts for 51.6% of total inequality in per-pupil education expendi-
ture, which is lower than the share of 65% or above as indicated by the analy-
sis of Wang (2001) and Tsang and Ding (2005). In Table 2, we observe a sig-
nificantly different historical pattern of Theil indices, which have a spike dur-
ing 2001-2002 with a much higher level of inequalities. The spike was caused 
mainly by the Municipalities (especially Shanghai), of which the per-pupil 
education expenditure was barely affected by the Tax-For-Fee reform because 
these Municipalities had a much smaller percentage of rural population than 
typical provinces, which suffered from the loss of education fees in their rural 
areas during the two-year period. The spike was quickly reduced after 2003, 
indicating some equalization effects of recent education reforms, in which the 
central government worked with provincial ones to increase investment for 
basic education in poorer areas and ethnic minority areas through fiscal trans-
fers to lower levels of government. However, the level of inequality during 
2003-2005 was still higher than that of the pre-2000 period.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10. The difference may also be caused by the use of different samples. Our study has about 
2800 county-level units in recent years, while Pan (2000)’s analysis was based on about 1900 
county-level units.  
11. The pupil numbers are calculated as total enrollments of elementary schools and second-
ary schools. The data in 1998 are not available.  
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Table 2. Theil Index of Per-pupil Education Expenditure 
 
 
 
Table 3. Theil Index of Per-pupil Education Expenditure (Without Mu-
nicipalities) 
 
 
 
Given the fact that China’s education investment is very unbalanced be-
tween urban and rural areas, and that Municipalities have significantly differ-
ent demographic structures than other provinces, we create the third set of 
Theil indices, as shown in Table 3, based on per-pupil education expenditure 
only in county-level jurisdictions of 27 regular provinces. Comparing Table 3 
and Table 2, we see that the level of education inequality becomes much lower 
after we exclude the Municipalities, but the gaps of basic education finance 
continued to be substantial during the 1999-2005 period as far as this sample 
of counties are concerned.  
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Per Pupil Education Expenditure* 468.1 500.1 675.3 785.7 814.4 982.5 1161.3
Between-county Theil Index 0.108 0.124 0.198 0.180 0.124 0.128 0.128
Two-level decomposition: 
County-in-province 0.056 0.069 0.069 0.056 0.063 0.062 0.064
  % contribution 51.6% 55.8% 34.7% 31.4% 50.5% 48.8% 49.9%
Between-province 0.052 0.055 0.129 0.123 0.061 0.065 0.064
  % contribution 48.4% 44.2% 65.3% 68.6% 49.5% 51.2% 50.1%
Total % contribution 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Four-level decomposition:
County-in-prefecture 0.022 0.033 0.034 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.026
  % contribution 20.2% 26.4% 17.4% 15.6% 20.6% 19.0% 19.9%
Prefecture-in-province 0.034 0.037 0.034 0.028 0.037 0.038 0.039
 % contribution 31.5% 29.4% 17.3% 15.7% 29.9% 29.8% 30.0%
Province-in-region 0.037 0.038 0.104 0.102 0.046 0.051 0.052
  % contribution 34.2% 30.5% 52.5% 56.9% 37.4% 40.0% 40.2%
Beteween-region 0.015 0.017 0.025 0.021 0.015 0.014 0.013
 % contribution 14.2% 13.7% 12.8% 11.8% 12.1% 11.1% 9.9%
Total % contribution 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
*: In 2000 real RMB. 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Per Pupil Education Expenditure* 425.5 498.8 635.5 742.6 814.5 983.1 1160.1
Between-county Theil Index 0.104 0.119 0.116 0.102 0.119 0.122 0.124
Two-level decomposition: 
County-in-province 0.057 0.071 0.068 0.055 0.064 0.063 0.065
  % contribution 54.8% 59.7% 59.1% 53.8% 53.2% 51.6% 52.7%
Between-province 0.047 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.056 0.059 0.059
  % contribution 45.2% 40.3% 40.9% 46.2% 46.8% 48.4% 47.3%
Total % contribution 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Four-level decomposition:
County-in-prefecture 0.022 0.033 0.031 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.026
  % contribution 21.2% 28.1% 26.6% 23.7% 21.5% 19.9% 20.9%
Prefecture-in-province 0.035 0.038 0.038 0.031 0.038 0.039 0.039
 % contribution 33.6% 31.6% 32.5% 30.1% 31.7% 31.7% 31.8%
Province-in-region 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.037 0.042 0.046 0.047
  % contribution 31.3% 26.8% 29.6% 36.1% 34.9% 37.6% 37.8%
Beteween-region 0.015 0.016 0.013 0.010 0.014 0.013 0.012
 % contribution 13.9% 13.5% 11.3% 10.0% 11.9% 10.8% 9.5%
Total % contribution 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
*: In 2000 real RMB. 
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             Theil Decomposition by Value                 Theil Decomposition by % 
(a) 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
	  	  	  
(c) 
 
 
 
                                             
 
Figure 1. Four-level Theil Decomposition for Education Expenditure 
(1999-2005) 
 
In Figure 1, we visually compare the three sets of Theil indices and their 
corresponding four-level decompositions. Panel (a) shows the results with per 
capita education expenditure, Panel (b) with per pupil education expenditure, 
	  14	  
	  
and Panel (c) with per pupil education expenditure after removing the four 
Municipalities from the sample. The results are significantly different from 
each other. This suggests that assessing spatial inequality of China’s education 
expenditure is sensitive to (a) different measures of education level, (b) differ-
ent data coverage, and (c) different levels of spatial aggregation. Regarding 
per-capita education expenditure, the Theil index shows a U-shape pattern 
during 1998-2005, with relatively lower levels of inequality in 2001 and 2002. 
Regarding per-pupil education expenditure with all available data, however, 
the Theil index shows a revised U-shaped pattern during 1999-2005, showing 
unusually high values in 2001 and 2002. When we see per-pupil education 
expenditure only in rural areas, the Theil index fluctuated during 1999-2005 
with an upward pattern especially in recent years.  
 
Compared to the widely cited research by Wang (2001), our results based 
on per-pupil education expenditure echo the previous finding in 1999, but the 
stories were different with a different measure or in other years. For per-capita 
education expenditure, for all years during 1999-2005, however, the variation 
was higher between-province (the upper two levels together) than within-
province (the lower two levels together). This discrepancy is likely driven by 
the combination of two factors. The first is the diverse demographic profile 
and age composition across provinces, as more urbanized provinces (especial-
ly the Municipalities) tend to have a much lower percentage of population 
among education ages due to the differential treatment of one-child policy in 
urban and rural areas (Leggy and Zhao, 2004). The second one is that China’s 
population statistics are based on Hukou registration record rather than the ac-
tual residing location. In recent decades, a significant percentage of population 
has temporarily migrated from rural areas to urban areas in coastal provinces. 
These people are still counted in their original provinces, while some of their 
children may be counted in school enrollment of the provinces where they 
work. Thus the per-capita measure may underestimate the level of education 
expenditure in some emigrant provinces by over-estimating the actual living 
population. For policy purposes, we suggest that future studies on China’s ed-
ucation inequality use the per-pupil measure instead of the per-capita one, be-
cause the former one more accurately reflects the link between education ex-
penditure and education needs. To assess the level of inequality and hence to 
design proper equalization policies, it shall be further advised to separate the 
Municipalities from other regular provinces as the Municipalities are far outli-
ers that significantly skews the overall distribution.  
 
Even if we use the per-pupil measure, for the second sets of Theil results 
based on all available data, the between-province variation was higher than 
within-province variation after 2000, especially in 2001 and 2002 when the 
between-province variation is significantly raised due to the outlier effect as-
sociated with Shanghai. For the third sets of Theil results based on a restricted 
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sample without Municipalities, between-province variation became very close 
to within-province variation after 2000.  
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Figure 2. Major Contributors to the Theil Index (1999-2005) 
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Figure 3. Major Contributors to the Theil Index 
Without Municipalities (1999-2005)  
In addition, we are interested in the provinces that are major contributors 
of the overall Theil index. The lists of these provinces, in both samples with or 
without Municipalities, are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. The top-five con-
tributors are the provinces that have the highest Theil elements, which are 
caused by a combination of much higher education expenditure level and big-
ger population shares in these provinces. The bottom-five contributors are the 
provinces that have the lowest and negative Theil elements, due to the fact that 
they have lower education expenditure level and also bigger population shares. 
Figure 2 clearly shows how Shanghai has driven up the Theil index in 2001 
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and 2002. In the rest of this discussion, we focus on Figure 3, which includes 
only regular provinces but not Municipalities. The top-five list has been quite 
stable, with Zhejiang Province always at the top and Jiangsu province almost 
always in the second position. In recent years, the Theil elements of these two 
provinces grow significantly. For example, Zhejiang Province’s per-pupil ed-
ucation expenditure was 50% higher than national average in 1999, and grew 
to be 100% higher than national average in 2005. The bottom-five list is quite 
stable as well, with Henan province always at the bottom and Anhui and Hu-
nan provinces always near the bottom. Henan Province’s per-pupil education 
expenditure stayed at about 50% of national average throughout the study pe-
riod, while the difference between Zhejiang and Henan grew from about 3 
times in 1999 to about 4 times in 2005. If we would include the four Munici-
palities, the gaps are even more appalling. The per-pupil education funding in 
Shanghai was about 8 times larger than that of Henan province in 1999, and 
the difference has grown to more than 10 times in 2005. Such results clearly 
indicate an increasing level of inequality of per-pupil education expenditure in 
recent years. 12 
	  
6. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION  
 
To summarize, the results of our analysis suggest that assessing spatial in-
equality of China’s education expenditure is sensitive to (a) different measures 
of education level, (b) different data coverage, and (c) different levels of spa-
tial aggregation. Studies based on data from different sources could generate 
discrepant results, thus we should pay special attention to the data issue in our 
future studies on China’s education equity. It is advisable to use per-pupil fis-
cal measures instead of per-capita ones, because China’s population statistics 
are based on Hukou registration record rather than the actual residing location. 
In addition, care should be taken in comparing the Municipalities with other 
provinces. With much higher levels of socioeconomic development and urban-
ization, the Municipalities are often outliners that would significantly skew the 
overall distribution across jurisdictions.   
 
With data between 1999 and 2005, our analysis shows that the inequality 
of per-pupil basic education expenditure increased sharply right after the Tax-
For-Fee reform, even though the Chinese central government shifted the ad-
ministrative responsibilities of basic education in rural areas from village and 
township governments to county governments and attempted to increase in-
vestment for basic education in poorer areas and ethnic minority areas. De-
spite the efforts of the central and provincial governments to increase fiscal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12. In a rough comparison, in the US where education-funding inequality has been a widely 
discussed policy issue, the gap between top and bottom states regarding per-pupil education 
funding is typically lower than 3 times. See http://blogs.census.gov/2011/05/25/funding-
public-education/.  
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transfers after 2003, the level of education finance inequality during the 2003-
2005 remains higher than that of 1999.  
 
Our Theil-index decomposition shows different results with different edu-
cation levels and in different years, suggesting that caution should be exer-
cised with the widely cited research finding that China’s school finance has 
higher within-province variation than between-province variation (Tsang and 
Ding, 2005; Wang, 2001). In fact, evidences in recent years seem to suggest a 
widening gap across provinces, and that the inequality is driven predominantly 
by several provinces with a much higher education expenditure level and big-
ger population, especially by Municipalities such as Shanghai and provinces 
such as Zhejiang and Jiangsu. Moreover, our spatial decomposition, for the 
first time in literature, shed light on the existence of education inequality 
across four geographic and administrative levels in China. Above the provin-
cial level, the inequality is more severe among provinces in the same region 
than across regions, especially when the Municipalities were included in the 
sample. Below the provincial level, the inequality is more severe across pre-
fectures than among counties in the same prefecture.  
 
This line of inquiry will have significant policy implications. After the 
Tax-For-Fee reform, the change of education finance responsibility to county-
level governments does not lead to a more equitable distribution of education 
resources when the inequality is measured at or above county-level govern-
ments. The fact that the inequality is driven primarily by between-province 
and between-prefecture variations suggests that policy makers may consider 
designing equalizing education grants correspondingly to reduce the level of 
inequality. First, the central government should provide additional funding to 
assist provinces with limited fiscal capacity to provide public education. Se-
cond, provincial governments may in turn make additional equalizing educa-
tion grants available to prefectures with lower fiscal capacity.  
 
A caveat of this study is that results of inequality analysis are sensitive to 
the choice of variables and inequality measures. In future research we plan to 
employ additional inequality measures and approaches of inequality decompo-
sition to study additional variables of education finance, such as different lev-
els of schooling (elementary, secondary, or both), or different coverage of ed-
ucation expenditures (budgeting, extra-budgeting, or off-budgeting), or educa-
tion expenditure for different groups of population (urban vs. rural, and Han 
vs. minorities). Moreover, equality of education funding amounts is not neces-
sarily equivalent to equality of education provision, because the cost of educa-
tion service delivery may vary significantly across localities. In future re-
search we hope to study cost factors of education service delivery and incor-
porate cost information in studying the equity and adequacy of education fi-
nance in China. Lastly, looking at the bigger pictures of public education fi-
nance and service delivery, it is important to distinguish local governments’ 
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choice or capacity in funding public education, and to account for their mana-
gerial capacities and performance in using education resources as inputs to 
generate program outputs toward education outcomes.  
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